Two decisions were issued by
the UN Committee on Women’s Discrimination (CEDAW) at its July session in
Geneva. In the first case, involving
Spain, the Committee concluded that gender-based stereotypes had caused the
authorities to fail to protect a woman and her daughter from the violence of
the husband. In the second case, from
the Philippines, a similar argument that gender-based stereotypes led to a
miscarriage of justice in a workplace harassment claim, the Committee concluded
the evidence was not sufficient to substantiate a claim and therefore dismissed
it on admissibility grounds. However, in a dissenting opinion, one Committee member concludes there was credible evidence of discrimination and argues that the case should have been decided differently.
Here is a brief summary of
each decision:
SPAIN
Gonzalez Carreno v. Spain, CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012 (July 18, 2014), decided 17
February 2014. Represented by counsel (Women’s
Link Worldwide). Gender stereotypes; appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations.
VIOLATION. Articles 2(a)-(f); 5(a), and 16(1)(d), read in conjunction with
article 1.
Mrs. Gonzalez Carreno was
married in 1996 and had a daughter born the same year. During their time
together, before and after the marriage, she was subjected to physical and
psychological violence by her husband. She left the marital residence several
times during 1999 as a consequence. In
September 1999 after her husband had a knife and threatened to kill her, she
sought protection from the police and filed a court complaint asking for
separation. A trial separation was
granted by the court in November. She
was continually subject to harassment and intimidation from her husband after
this, including death threats in the street and by telephone. Her daughter became fearful of her father in
visitations due to threats and insults of the mother. In one incident he tried
to physically remove the child from the mother’s car; the police were called
and had to intervene. He threatened to kidnap the girl, and physically grabbed
Mrs. Gonzalez Carreno’s hair and threw her to the ground while she had her
daughter in her arms. Several similar
incidents are also noted in the complaint.
Mrs. Gonzalez Carreno filed
more than 30 complaints with the civil guard and the courts, repeatedly seeking
protective orders against her husband.
She also sought a regime of monitored child visits and payment of child
support. Her husband systematically
failed to comply with these court orders.
Because she had very little money or means of support, she sought
possession of the marital residence even though she had voluntarily left it
earlier. Spanish civil law provides that
the use and enjoyment of the family dwelling is granted to the spouse in a
divorce proceeding who has the guardianship and custody of a minor.
Her husband was convicted on
one occasion, in October 2000, of stalking and harassing her, but the other
complaints did not lead to any punishment.
In other cases protective orders were routinely violated by the husband
or not enforced by the courts and police, all without legal consequences to the
husband. In November 2001 the court
ordered the final divorce, which disregarded the numerous complaints of abuse
and did not refer to habitual ill-treatment as being the cause of separation.
Child visits were ordered initially to be monitored and supervised, but only
for one month, after which the visits would be gradually expanded.
Despite numerous incidents
of violence by her husband during the year and a half of supervised visits, the
court authorized unsupervised visits in a May 2002 order. Mrs. Gonzalez Carreno appealed this decision
but lost. In April 2003 her husband
picked up the child for visitation and failed to return her. When the police
were notified they found both the daughter and father dead in the father’s
dwelling, apparently a murder-suicide.
In April 2004 Mrs. Gonzalez
Carreno filed a claim with the Ministry of Justice for compensation for
miscarriage of justice, alleging negligence by the administrative and judicial
authorities. She maintained that both
the judicial organs and social services had failed in their obligation to
protect the life of her daughter, despite the many occasions when she had
informed the courts and police about the danger the girl faced with her
father. The Ministry of Justice denied
the claim. She made several appeals but was not successful.
The Committee concludes that
violations have occurred. The record is
replete with many examples of violent incidents and the failure to include the
child in protective orders and other protections sought. A psychological report in September 2001 had
concluded the husband had “an obsessive-compulsive disorder with aspects of
pathological jealousy and a tendency to distort reality which could degenerate
into a disorder similar to paranoia.”
All of these elements reflect a pattern of action which responds to a
stereotyped conception of visiting rights which in the present case gave clear
advantages to the father despite his abusive conduct and minimized the
situation of mother and daughter as victims of violence, placing them in a
vulnerable position. The Committee notes
in this regard that in matters of child custody and visiting rights, the best
interests of the child must be a central concern and that when national
authorities adopt decisions in that regard they must take into account the
existence of a context of domestic violence.
The Committee reiterates
that gender-based violence which impairs or mollifies the enjoyment by women of
human rights under general international law or under human rights conventions,
is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention. This discrimination is not limited to acts
committed by or on behalf of Governments.
States may also be responsible for acts of private persons if they do
not act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate
and punish acts of violence and to compensate victims.
In this case the Committee
decides that the authorities, in deciding on the establishment of an
unsupervised scheme of visits, applied stereotyped and therefore discriminatory
notions in a context of domestic violence and failed to provide due
supervision, infringing their obligations under articles 2(a), (d), (e) and
(f); 5(a); and 16, paragraph 1(d) of the Convention. In addition, the failure to pay reparations
to Ms. Gonzalez Carreno was a violation of article 2(b) and (c) of the
Convention. The Committee orders the
government to pay appropriate reparations to her and to conduct an exhaustive
and impartial investigation to determine where there are failures in the
government’s structures and practices that have caused Mrs. Gonzalez Carreno
and her daughter to be deprived of protection.
In addition, they are ordered to take appropriate and effective measures
generally to address prior acts of domestic violence in cases of custody or
visiting rights so that the safety of the children are not endangered, and to
strengthen the legal framework addressing situations of domestic violence, and
finally to provide mandatory training for judges and administrative personnel
on combating domestic violence.
VIOLATIONS FOUND. The government is ordered to respond within six
months.
PHILIPPINES
M.S. v. The Philippines, CEDAW/C/58/D/30/2011 (August 15, 2014), decided 16
July 2014. Represented by counsel (H.
Harry L. Roque Jr.). Employment/right to
protection of health and to safety in working conditions. INADMISSIBLE. Dissenting opinion of Ms. Schulz (4 pages). [2
members abstained]
Ms. M.S. worked for a
telecommunications corporation in the Philippines from August 1998 to June
2000. She had been praised for her job
performance on numerous occasions by her superiors. In May 1999 she began receiving unwanted
sexual advances from one of her superiors at company social events and in the
office. She complained to her immediate
supervisor and said she was going to file a complaint. Her supervisor
discouraged her from doing so. The
unwanted advances continued, causing her stress and anxiety, eventually leading
to a leave of absence by her in April 2000.
She believed her job performance continued to be at an optimal level,
but was shocked to suddenly begin receiving unfavorable evaluations from her
superiors. Efforts to get an explanation
were stonewalled. She resigned from her job in June 2000.
She initiated criminal
proceedings against the two superiors, but the case was ultimately dismissed
for lack of probable cause. She asked
for reconsideration and was granted a new opportunity to file charges. The
respondents, her two former superiors, then filed for reconsideration but lost.
The charges against one of the defendants was dismissed eventually because he
died. She also filed a labor case but
lost, the arbiter concluding she had voluntarily resigned. She appealed but
lost again. She then appealed to the
next level and won, the Court of Appeals having concluded that the various
circumstances of the sexual harassment against her had been “conveniently
ignored” by the labor arbiter. The
defendants appealed to the Supreme Court and won, dismissing her claim again.
The Committee concludes that
the case is not admissible. The facts were assessed by the national authorities
in a thorough fashion. The Committee
does not normally replace the national authorities in matters of this nature,
unless it can be established that the evaluation was biased or based on gender
harmful stereotypes that constitute discrimination against women, or was
clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. Nothing in the record before the Committee
establishes any of these grounds to overturn the national courts’ final
findings.
In a dissenting opinion,
Committee member Patricia Schulz argues that the claims of gender stereotyping
by the complainant are credible and that the government fails to respond to
them in a convincing manner. She highlights in italics specific factual
allegations that go unchallenged by the government and that she feels establish
a finding of harmful gender stereotypes used in a discriminatory manner. However, she also views the five year delay
before the complainant brought this complaint to the Committee as too long, and
as an alternative grounds for dismissing the claim, and finding it
inadmissible.
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